Long Island

Published on: February 10, 2013

Taxi Involved in Car Accident

by Stephen Bilkis

This action was instituted by the plaintiff for alleged personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident occurring on January 27, 2003 at approximately 12.21 a.m. on Barton Avenue at or near its intersection with Valley Road in Patchogue, Suffolk County on Long Island, New York. A source said that, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant taxi company, being driven by co-defendant, attempted to make a left turn from Barton Avenue, eastbound, onto Valley Road without signaling and came into contact with the plaintiff’s vehicle which was proceeding straight on Barton Avenue in a westerly direction. The plaintiff claims she hit the steering wheel and was bleeding from her left knee. This lawsuit thereafter ensued.

A Lawyer said that, the defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR §3212 dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff has not sustained a “serious physical injury” as that term is defined in Insurance Law §5102(d). The defendants submit medical proof to substantiate their claim that the plaintiff failed to sustain a “serious injury” in the car accident. The plaintiff opposes the requested relief in an attorney’s affirmation arid submission of the plaintiff’s deposition but proffers no medical proof to substantiate the claim of a “serious physical injury”.The issue in this case is whether plaintiff sustained serious personal injury as defined under the Insurance Law.

The function of the Court on a motion for summary judgment is issue finding not issue determination. It is a most drastic remedy which should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue or where the issue is even arguable. To grant summary judgment it must clearly appear that no material and triable issue of fact is presented. This drastic remedy should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of such issues, or where the issue is `arguable; `issue finding, rather than issue determination is the key to the procedure.

Published on: February 2, 2013

Iron Works Company in Traffic Accident

by Stephen Bilkis

Two construction and repair crewmen from the water district were riding in the car of a co-worker on their way to work when their car was hit in the rear end by a truck driven by an employee of an iron works company.

Both the Bronx crewmen were injured. The other crewman, the one sitting in the back sustained spinal injury from the force of the impact of the collision. His spinal injury consisted of bulging discs in the cervical spine and in the lumbar spine. Because of these injuries, he suffered painful muscle spasms, migraine headaches and numbness in the right arm and shoulder. He was treated in the hospital and was confined to bed for six weeks following the accident. After the confinement, the crewman could not return to his regular job as repair crewman because he could not lift materials. He had difficulty bending down and he could not sit or stand for long periods of time.

Both the crewmen filed a suit in damages against the two drivers of the motor vehicles involved in the car accident. They both claimed compensation for damages under the Insurance Law for the spinal injuries and fractures they sustained as a result of the accident. The driver from the iron works company filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the injuries sustained by the crewmen were not serious injuries and so they are not compensable injuries. The L.I. crewman was examined by independent physicians but the physicians examined the crewmen two years after the accident.

Published on: November 12, 2012

The children of the also assert l if the estate of their mother

by Stephen Bilkis

A father died as a result of a vehicular accident. His surviving spouse and their two children filed a case for wrongful death against the owners of the vehicle that collided with the father’s car. After the litigation, the owners of the vehicle paid a sum of $182, 717.00 in damages.

By the time that the wrongful death suit was terminated, the surviving spouse had also died. The owners of the vehicles then filed this action to ask the court to determine who should receive the judgment award, and what the sharing should be among those who should receive the judgment award. The Long Island owners of the car that collided with the deceased’s car came to court to ask for a final determination as to the sharing of the heirs and surviving relative of the deceased in the proceeds of the wrongful death action.

The estate of the surviving spouse claims that it should receive half of the proceeds from the wrongful death suit as she is entitled to share in her deceased husband’s estate. The two surviving children of the deceased father asked for the disqualification of the surviving spouse’s estate and that the proceeds should instead be shared by them, the two children of the deceased.

Published on: October 22, 2012

A man drove to the house of a friend whom he was supposed to pick up

by Stephen Bilkis

A man drove to the house of a friend whom he was supposed to pick up. When he got to his friend’s house, he left the car engine running with the key in the ignition to ring the doorbell and alert his friend that he had already arrived to pick him up. While he was in the house, a man stole the car that was parked in the driveway. The thief took the car and drove off at such a high speed.

In the meantime another man was stopped at an intersection. He was waiting for the light to turn green so that he can make a left turn. As he was waiting for the traffic signal, the thief was driving from the same direction at such a high speed. The thief lost control of the He car and hit the car that was stopped at the intersection.

The impact of the stolen car hitting the stopped car was so great that the driver of the parked car lost consciousness while still inside his car. When the parked car was struck from behind by the stolen car, the parked car also careened off and hit another car.

Published on: October 13, 2012

After the plaintiff submitted its medical evidence,

by Stephen Bilkis

This involves a case where the court ruled that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that he suffered serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law Section 5102 (d).

Plaintiff, age 24, alleged that on August 21, 2006, at approximately 11:20 a.m., a motor vehicle owned and operated by him came into contact with a vehicle owned by defendant owner and operated by defendant driver. The car accidentoccurred on Old Country Road, at its intersection with Frost Street, County of Nassau, Long Island. Defendants moved for an order dismissing plaintiffs complaint pursuant to CPLR §3212, on grounds that plaintiff failed to sustain a “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law §5102(d).

Insurance Law §5102(d) provides that a “serious injury means a personal injury which results in (1) death; (2) dismemberment; (3) significant disfigurement; (4) a fracture; (5) loss of a fetus; (6) permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; (7) permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member; (8) significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or (9) a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person’s usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment” (numbered by the Court). The Court’s consideration in this action is confined to whether plaintiffs injuries constitute a permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member (7) or significant limitation of use of a body function or system.

Published on: October 10, 2012

Locustwood

by Stephen Bilkis

This involves a case where the court ruled that plaintiff did not sustain a “serious injury” contemplated under New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d).

A car accident occurred on January 30, 2008, at approximately 8:15 a.m., at or near the intersection of Hempstead Turnpike and Locustwood Boulevard, Elmont, Nassau County, Long Island. The accident involved a 2005 Suzuki Verona four-door sedan owned and operated by defendant. On that date, at that time, it was raining out and plaintiff, who is four feet ten inches tall, was holding an umbrella standing on the southwest corner of the aforementioned intersection waiting for the pedestrian light to change from red to green so she could cross Hempstead Turnpike. Plaintiff claimed that she looked before crossing and did not see any vehicles on Locustwood Boulevard making a turn onto Hempstead Turnpike. Plaintiff further claimed that, as she was crossing Hempstead Turnpike, she was struck in the rear, specifically her lower back, by the front of defendant’s vehicle. As a result of the impact, plaintiff was thrown to the side. Plaintiff commenced an action by the filing a Verified Complaint for spinal injuries sustained.

Defendant argued that plaintiff already crossed in front of her, but then due to wind catching her umbrella, plaintiff walked backwards into the defendants vehicle. Plaintiff denied that the wind turned her umbrella inside out. Clearly, the parties give conflicting testimony with regard to how the accident occurred and plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment.

Published on: October 8, 2012

According to the court, while a cessation of treatment is not dispositive

by Stephen Bilkis

This involves a case where the court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to prove that the latter suffered serious injury threshold requirement of Insurance Law Sec. 5102 (d).

Plaintiff alleged that a car accident occurred on September 15, 2002 at approximately 5:15 p.m. at the intersection of Carman Avenue and Choir Lane in the Town of Hempstead, Long Island. Plaintiff claimed that as a result thereof, she suffered serious injuries. At her oral examination before trial, the Plaintiff testified that she had a preexisting spinal injury to her lower back from another car accident in 1988. After being treated for the injuries from that accident, the Plaintiff continued treating with a chiropractor for occasional discomfort to her back, “as needed,” rather than having a set schedule of appointments. Following the subject accident, it was suggested by multiple doctors that the Plaintiff undergo surgery and/or physical therapy, but she declined and chose to continue seeing the chiropractor instead. The Plaintiff also declined pain medication immediately following the accident, preferring over the counter medication. But plaintiff admitted she had her first doctor visit for medical expert opinion after 18 months from the accident. Following the accident, Plaintiff testified to having trouble bending over, walking long distances, participating in her children’s activities, dancing, hiking and brushing her teeth. Plaintiff claimed that she had some occasional discomfort in her back prior to the subject accident, and that the accident exacerbated that pain into a chronic condition.

The Court held that Plaintiff’s claims that her injuries satisfy the 90/180 category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) are unsupported and contradicted by her own testimony wherein she states that she only missed a week and a half of work and was confined to her home or bed for one week. Additionally, the Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that she was “medically” impaired from doing any daily activities as a result of this accident for 90 days within the first 180 days following the subject accident.

Published on: October 3, 2012

The Court held that the lady driver of the Honda Civic

by Stephen Bilkis

A lady was driving a Honda Civic on September 17, 2007 on the Jericho Turnpike. She was parked in traffic waiting for the light to turn green when a Jeep hit her car from behind. The impact of the rear-end collision pushed her Honda Civic one car length away. Her Honda Civic struck the car in front of her.

The impact of the collision sent the lady driver of the Honda Civic in a lurching motion. She hit the steering wheel and was pulled back by gravity so that she hit her neck and back on the head rest. She claims that she twisted her neck and was in pain.

She claims that she sustained spinal injury in her cervical and lumbar spine. She claims to have discs that have been misaligned and resulted in swellings which brought about impingement of the nerves and great pain.

Published on: September 21, 2012

On 18 to 19 October 2007, at around midnight

by Stephen Bilkis

On 18 to 19 October 2007, at around midnight, the defendant went to the Island Rock nightclub in Hempstead with his girlfriend, a friend of his girlfriend and another individual. After drinking alcohol at the nightclub, the defendant and the other individual left and went to a nearby parking lot. At that time, the defendant did not appear intoxicated. According to the girlfriend’s friend, the defendant stated in the parking lot that he lost his shit, presumably referring to drugs, and the defendant became upset. The defendant went into the trunk of his car and searched for something. The defendant then began arguing with his girlfriend. At approximately 3:15 A.M., several witnesses heard gunshots, but no one reported having seen the defendant fire a gun. The defendant then angrily ordered the girlfriend’s friend to leave with his girlfriend, which they did, driving the defendant’s girlfriend home. The defendant and the other individual then entered the defendant’s vehicle, with the defendant driving. When police officers arrived at the parking lot only minutes later, at about 3:20 A.M., the defendant had left, and the officers recovered several 9–millimeter shell casings in the parking lot. At approximately 3:30 A.M., the defendant’s vehicle was seen traveling west in the eastbound lanes of the Southern State Parkway at a speed of 70 to 75 miles per hour. According to numerous witnesses, the defendant’s vehicle traveled in the wrong direction from about exit 19 to exit 13, a distance of approximately five miles. A witness observed the defendant driving directly at him while changing lanes. That witness had to immediately pull his vehicle onto the shoulder to avoid a collision. This long Island witness saw that the defendant continued driving the wrong way, and the witness observed the other vehicles on the parkway split apart in order to get away from the defendant. The witness testified that the defendant was steadily going, not braking, nothing; that he was just going; that he was speeding. Meanwhile, another witness, a Police Sergeant was also driving in the proper direction in the left eastbound lane of the parkway. As the Sergeant passed exit 14, he observed the defendant’s vehicle driving towards him at a very high rate of speed, which caused the Sergeant to violently turn his steering wheel to the right to avoid a collision. The defendant’s car came within inches of the Sergeant’s vehicle. According to the Sergeant, the defendant made absolutely no effort to get out of the way. Near exit 13, the defendant’s vehicle, without ever having slowed down, collided with the victim’s vehicle, killing the victim instantly and incinerating the victim’s vehicle. When emergency services and police arrived on the scene and attempted to remove the defendant from his damaged vehicle, the defendant was agitated and his breath emitted a strong odor of alcohol. Following the defendant’s arrest, a blood sample taken from him at 4:49 A.M., just over an hour after the motor vehicle accident, indicated that his blood alcohol content (hereinafter BAC) was 0.19%. After the defendant was removed from his vehicle, the police began conducting an inventory search of the vehicle. The discovery of several 9–millimeter rounds in the trunk, however, transformed the search from inventory to investigatory, during which the police recovered a 9–millimeter semiautomatic pistol, what was later determined to be .395 grams of cocaine (cocaine possession) beneath the front passenger seat, and 41 rounds of 9–millimeter bullets contained in a partially loaded magazine and a box in the trunk. The gun recovered from the defendant’s vehicle matched the shell casings found in the parking lot near the nightclub.

Consequently, the defendant was arrested and charged. On 16 September 2008, the County Court, Nassau County, found him guilty of murder in the second degree, vehicular manslaughter in the first degree, aggravated driving while intoxicated or DWI, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree.

The defendant filed an omnibus motion to suppress physical evidence which was denied by the court. The defendant then appeals from the said decision of the court.

Published on: September 8, 2012

Police officers were called to the scene of a car accident

by Stephen Bilkis

Police officers were called to the scene of a car accident at the corner of Connecticut and West Beach Streets. Two cars were involved in the mishap: a Chevrolet with damage to its front bumper and a Volkswagen with damage to its rear bumper.

The Long Island police officers asked for the licence and registration of both drivers. As the police officers were speaking with the drivers, they noticed that the driver of the Chevrolet did not smell of alcohol but his speech was slurred and he did not walk straight. The officers asked the driver of the Chevrolet to walk on a line on the side of the road but the man walked in a zigzag pattern instead.

The police officers arrested the driver of the Chevrolet and brought him to police headquarters for an alcohol breath test. AT the precinct, the breath analyzer test showed that the driver’s blood alcohol level was only 0.03. The friends of the driver who were also passengers in the car came to the police station and informed police that the driver spoke with a slight slurring and his gait was naturally uneven. They assured the police that their friend was not driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol.