Distracted Driving

Published on: June 26, 2024

Case alleging police negligence linked to distracted driving incident. Alhaji v. City of N.Y. 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 32171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)

by Stephen Bilkis

In a recent legal action concerning alleged negligent motor vehicle operation, defendants sought reargument of a court order requiring disclosure of cell phone records. The relevance of cell phone records lies in determining whether the defendant, a police officer, was distracted by phone use while driving, potentially contributing to the accident. The plaintiff alleges that the officer negligently entered a highway in the wrong direction, leading to a collision that caused significant injuries. Cell phone records could provide crucial evidence to substantiate or refute this claim. They may reveal the officer’s phone activity just before and after the accident, shedding light on his state of attention and actions leading up to the collision.

Given the legal framework, negligence in motor vehicle operation includes distractions such as cell phone use, which is prohibited by law while driving. Proving that the officer was using his phone during the incident could establish negligence per se, making it easier to establish liability for the accident. Conversely, if the records show no phone activity at the time, it could support the officer’s defense against the negligence claim. Therefore, these records are pivotal in determining the sequence of events and the officer’s state of attention during the critical moments leading to the collision.

Background Facts

Published on: June 26, 2024

In a distracted driving case, Court finds New York State 75% liable for claimant’s accident injuries. Jordan v. State # 2019-029-040 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Jun. 26, 2019)

by Stephen Bilkis

In a distracted driving case, the claimant was involved in an accident with a state-owned van. Using a cell phone while driving is commonly referred to as distracted driving, a dangerous practice that diverts a driver’s attention away from the road. In New York, this behavior is explicitly prohibited under traffic laws due to its potential to cause accidents, injuries, and fatalities. The laws aim to ensure that drivers maintain full focus on operating their vehicles safely. Violations of these laws can result in fines, penalties, and legal consequences, reflecting the serious risks associated with distracted driving and the importance of adhering to regulations designed to protect public safety on the roads.

Background Facts

Ruben de Jesus Monroy Jordan was employed by Shining Star Landscaping and had traveled to New City for a landscaping job at a residence located off West Clarkstown Road (WCR). While preparing to cross WCR, Mr. Monroy Jordan observed fast-moving traffic in both directions. He positioned the mower near the edge of the road and was waiting for a safe moment to proceed when a van approached from his left. Despite his view being unobstructed, he did not see the van until it collided with the mower. The impact threw him into the air, causing him to land on the pavement and sustain injuries. The van, which had struck the mower and became entangled with it, dragged both for a significant distance. During his testimony, Mr. Monroy Jordan mentioned that he observed the defendant using a cell phone while driving, which he believed contributed to the accident.

Published on: March 6, 2013

Insurance claims that injuries are not serious

by Stephen Bilkis

On 6 July 2006, plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident. Consequently, plaintiff filed a personal injury action against The Bronx defendant to recover damages for the injuries he sustained as a result of the accident. In opposition, defendant moved for a motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that plaintiff has not sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law.

The issue that was brought before the court for resolution was whether or not plaintiff has sustained a personal injury that is within the definition of serious injury under Insurance Law, and, as such, entitles him to recover damages from defendant.

As provided for under the no-fault law, in order to maintain an action for personal injury, a plaintiff must establish that a serious injury has been sustained. This is pursuant to the ruling of the court in the landmark case of Licari v. Elliot which was decided sometime in 1982. As a rule, the proponent of a motion for summary judgment must tender sufficient evidence to show the absence of any material issue of fact and the right to judgment as a matter of law; as held in the case of Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, in 1986, and the case of Winegrad v. New York Univ. Medical Center, in 1985. Pursuant to the court’s ruling in the case of Lowe v. Bennett, which was decided by the 1st Department sometime in 1986, the burden rests on defendants to establish, by the submission of evidentiary proof in admissible form, that plaintiff has not suffered a serious injury. When a defendant’s motion is sufficient to raise the issue of whether a serious injury has been sustained, the burden shifts and it is then incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce prima facie evidence in admissible form to support the claim of serious injury. This was the Westchester court’s ruling in the cases of Licari v. Elliot and Lopez v. Senatore, in 1985. In support of a claim that plaintiff has not sustained a serious injury, a defendant may rely either on the sworn statements of the defendant’s examining physician or the unsworn reports of plaintiff’s examining physician. Once the burden shifts, it is incumbent upon plaintiff, in opposition to defendant’s motion, to submit proof of serious injury in admissible form. Unsworn reports of plaintiff’s examining doctor or chiropractor will not be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Thus, a medical affirmation or affidavit which is based on a physician’s personal examination and observations of plaintiff is an acceptable method to provide a doctor’s opinion regarding the existence and extent of a plaintiff’s serious injury. As held in the cases of Gonzalez v. Vasquez in 2003 and Ayzen v. Melendez in 2002, unsworn MRI reports are not competent evidence unless both sides rely on those reports. However, in order to be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of serious physical injury, the affirmation or affidavit must contain medical findings, which are based on the physician’s own examination, tests and observations and review of the record rather than manifesting only the plaintiff’s subjective complaints. It must be noted that a chiropractor is not one of the persons authorized by the CPLR to provide a statement by affirmation, and thus, for a chiropractor, only an affidavit containing the requisite findings will suffice; as ruled in the cases of Pichardo v. Blum in 1999 and Feintuch v. Grella in 2003. In any event, the findings, which must be submitted in a competent statement under oath, or affirmation, when permitted, must demonstrate that plaintiff sustained at least one of the categories of serious injury as enumerated in Insurance Law. For example, in the case of Parker v. DeFontaine, it was held that a medical affidavit, which demonstrated that the plaintiff’s threshold motion limitations were objectively measured and observed by the physician, was sufficient to establish that plaintiff has suffered a serious injury within the meaning of that term as set forth in Article 51 of the Insurance Law. In other words, a physician’s observation as to actual limitations qualifies as objective evidence since it is based on the physician’s own examinations. Besides, in the absence of objective medical evidence in admissible form of serious injury, plaintiff’s self-serving affidavit is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

Published on: February 20, 2013

Compensation depends on the severity of the injury

by Stephen Bilkis

As described in the Appellate Court’s prior opinion, the complainant woman had two industrial accidents while she was working for the Paint Company before she was involved in an automobile accident that had nothing to do with work. Originally, the judge of compensation claims denied all benefits on the theory that the third (non-compensable) accident was the major contributing cause of her injuries and disability. The Manhattan Appellate Court reversed and remanded, holding that the claimant is entitled to any medical or compensation benefits attributable to either or both of the work-related accidents.

On remand, a successor judge of compensation claims found that the woman’s head injury and jaw condition were causally related solely to the first industrial accident, that her cervical and thoracic spinal injuries were related to all three accidents, and that her lumbar spinal condition was wholly unrelated to the first accident, but attributable equally to the second and third accidents. On the basis of competent, substantial evidence, the judge of compensation claims attributed two-thirds of the woman’s need for treatment of her cervical spine, thoracic spine, and psychiatric problems to the industrial accidents.

The Staten Island employer of a claimant who suffers an industrial injury must furnish to the employee such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require. Medical care is properly awarded when the need for such care arises from the combined effect of industrial and nonindustrial conditions. As indicated, the employer is responsible for treatment required by the non-compensable injury if such treatment would not presently be required but for the existence of the compensable injury. The Appellate Court thus approves the approach the judge of compensation claims took on the medical benefits questions, and most of the results he reached.

Published on: February 13, 2013

Traffic Light in Question in Huntington

by Stephen Bilkis

This action is for personal injuries alleged to have occurred as a result of a motor vehicle accidentinvolving vehicles driven by plaintiff, , and defendant, , on February 19, 2002, at the intersection of Deepdale Drive and New York Avenue, Town of Huntington, New York. A Suffolk reporter said that, plaintiff served a summons and complaint on defendant. Thereafter, defendant served a third-party summons and complaint on third-party defendant. Within the third-party complaint, defendant alleged that the traffic light at the subject intersection was malfunctioning and inoperable at the time of the car accident.

A doctor said that, by order dated April 1, 2005, the third-party defendant was granted summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint and all cross-claims against it. Within the aforementioned Order, the Court noted that during the discovery process, it was revealed that the town, not the County of Suffolk, “owned operated and controlled” the traffic signal at the subject intersection. A Lawyer said that, by Order dated March 23, 2007, this Court granted the summary judgment motions of second third-party defendant, and third-party defendant, on the grounds that there was no issue of material fact regarding the liability of those defendants. Defendant now moves for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff has not met the serious injury threshold as set forth in Insurance Law § 5102(d). In support thereof, defendant has submitted, among other things, the deposition transcript of plaintiff, and reports from two doctors who conducted independent medical examinations of plaintiff.

A Lawyer said that, plaintiff served a verified bill of particulars, sworn to on December 11, 2003, which alleged that she suffered the following injuries as a result of the accident: sprain and contusion of left hip; pain in left hip; pain in left wrist; and injuries to the cervical spine, including spinal nerve root compression and bulging discs. Each injury, except for superficial ones, was alleged to be permanent and/or long lasting, and caused diminution of use and motion of the neck and back. Plaintiff appeared for a deposition, and was thereafter physically examined, on or about October 25, 2006, by an orthopedist, and a neurologist, both of whom were designated by defendant. After conducting objective tests on plaintiff, the doctors found, as indicated by their sworn reports, that plaintiff had no orthopedic impairment and no neurologic injury. The orthopedist found that plaintiff may perform the daily activities of living, without restriction, and the neurologist found no permanency or disability as a result of the subject accident. Based upon these findings, a source said that defendant argues that plaintiff has not satisfied the “serious injury” threshold, as set forth in Insurance Law § 5102(d). Defendant contends that plaintiff’s alleged soft tissue spinal injuries do not constitute a serious injury.

Published on: February 6, 2013

Accident at Jewel Avenue

by Stephen Bilkis

This action arises from a motor vehicle accidentwhich occurred on September 19, 2008, at approximately 5:30 p.m., in the eastbound lanes of the Grand Central Parkway, Queens, New York, at or near its intersection with the Jewel Avenue Exit. The accident involved a 2005 Porche Boxster owned and operated by plaintiff and a 1986 Volvo Station Wagon owned by defendant and operated by defendant driver. Plaintiffs commenced this action by the filing and service of a Summons and Verified Complaint.

A source said that, it is plaintiff’s contention that the accident occurred when his vehicle, moving slowly in stop and go traffic on the Grand Central Parkway, was struck in the rear by defendants’ vehicle. Plaintiff claims that defendant driver admitted at his Examination Before Trial (“EBT”) that he did not see plaintiff’s vehicle until the moment of collision and offered no explanation for said collision other than his failure to pay attention to the road. Plaintiff claims that defendant driver was the negligent party in that he failed his duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident. Plaintiff additionally claims that defendant driver cannot come up with a non-negligent explanation for striking plaintiff vehicle in the rear.

A Lawyer said that, in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, defendants argue that, at his EBT, defendant driver testified that there were no brake lights illuminated on plaintiff’s vehicle just before the accident. Plaintiff submits that there is therefore an issue of fact as to the circumstances surrounding the accident and plaintiff’s motion should be denied. Defendants assert that a factual issue remains as to the extent that plaintiff’s comparative fault contributed to the happening of the subject accident by virtue of his failure to exercise ordinary prudence and to use such care to avoid the collision as an ordinarily prudent person would have under the circumstances.

Published on: February 2, 2013

Iron Works Company in Traffic Accident

by Stephen Bilkis

Two construction and repair crewmen from the water district were riding in the car of a co-worker on their way to work when their car was hit in the rear end by a truck driven by an employee of an iron works company.

Both the Bronx crewmen were injured. The other crewman, the one sitting in the back sustained spinal injury from the force of the impact of the collision. His spinal injury consisted of bulging discs in the cervical spine and in the lumbar spine. Because of these injuries, he suffered painful muscle spasms, migraine headaches and numbness in the right arm and shoulder. He was treated in the hospital and was confined to bed for six weeks following the accident. After the confinement, the crewman could not return to his regular job as repair crewman because he could not lift materials. He had difficulty bending down and he could not sit or stand for long periods of time.

Both the crewmen filed a suit in damages against the two drivers of the motor vehicles involved in the car accident. They both claimed compensation for damages under the Insurance Law for the spinal injuries and fractures they sustained as a result of the accident. The driver from the iron works company filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the injuries sustained by the crewmen were not serious injuries and so they are not compensable injuries. The L.I. crewman was examined by independent physicians but the physicians examined the crewmen two years after the accident.

Published on: January 27, 2013

Spine Fracture a Result of Car Accident

by Stephen Bilkis

A employee of a nursing home also worked part-time at a realty office as a clerk. She was married and she had young children. She rode as a passenger in the car driven by a friend. The car she was riding in was involved in a car accident. She lost consciousness and was taken to the hospital in an ambulance. When she regained consciousness, she complained of pain in her neck, her spine, her shoulder, her wrist, her hips, her knees and her ankle.

The initial diagnosis was a fracture of her cervical spine. MRI and CT Scans as well as x-rays were taken of her but a fracture was ruled out. She stayed a total of three days in the hospital but she was later discharged. She was ordered to see a neurologist to determine the cause of her pain. She was also advised to see an orthopedist and a chiropractor for the management of the pain she was experiencing. She was also advised to undergo physical therapy.

The Westchester employee testified that she sustained a back injury at work sometime six years prior to the accident and she was also in a motor vehicle accident nine years prior to the accident. She experienced pain in her lower spine and legs but she also testified that the pain she felt then was not in the same area that she feels pain now. She claims that she can no longer lift heavy things the way she used to do before the accident in 2006. She worked in a nursing home and her duties include assisting the elderly patients and residents in the nursing home. After the accident, she can no longer stand or sit for long periods of time and she has difficulty assisting to the patients’ physical needs. She couldn’t engage in sports the way she used to do prior to the accident and she cannot do laundry anymore as laundry involved bending down and lifting heavy clothes, lifting wet clothes and putting them in the dryer. All the movements involved the use of her back which now gave her constant pain.

Published on: January 19, 2013

Policeman Injured in Car Accident

by Stephen Bilkis

Petitioner, a sergeant with the Suffolk County Police Department, injured his back at the scene of a motor vehicle accidentin February 2004 when he slipped while moving the door of the vehicle-which had been removed by the fire department-so that rescue personnel would have better access to the accident victim. Petitioner’s application for performance of duty disability retirement benefits was denied by respondent New York State and Local Police and Fire Retirement System on the ground that petitioner was not permanently incapacitated from the performance of his duties. A Hearing Officer affirmed the denial of benefits following a hearing, and respondent Comptroller upheld this determination upon administrative review.

A board-certified orthopedic surgeon, testified that petitioner’s MRI showed “significant damage to the spinal column with multiple level herniations.” An EMG study revealed damage and irritation not only to the spinal cord, but to the nerves of the spinal cord. The orthopedic surgeon, who started treating petitioner eight months after his injury and continues to see petitioner every six weeks, concluded that the findings on these two objective tests were compatible with petitioner’s subjective complaints. The orthopedic surgeon diagnosed petitioner with lumbosacral herniated discs, sciatica and back pain, and he testified that petitioner’s injury was permanent. Reports were also put into evidence on petitioner’s behalf by an osteopath who treats petitioner three times a week, by an orthopedist who conducted an independent medical exam on behalf of petitioner’s employer, by another orthopedic surgeon who performed an independent medical exam on behalf of the Workers’ Compensation Board, and by a neurologist. Each physician concurred with the orthopedic’s finding of disc herniation and they also noted various levels of muscle spasm, and the degree of permanency noted in their reports ranged from “[p]artial moderate permanent” to total disability.

A report was also submitted into evidence by an orthopedic surgeon who examined petitioner on behalf of the Retirement System. The orthopedic surgeon diagnosed petitioner, after an exceedingly brief examination, with “resolved low back strain,” finding no muscle spasm and no evidence of disability. The surgeon testified, however, that if petitioner merely had a low back strain, the EMG and MRI would not have shown the nerve damage and disc herniation. Testimony further revealed that as a result of the herniation and radiculopathy, petitioner’s ability to sit, stand and lift are limited such that he cannot go into the field as he did prior to this incident, he continues to experience severe pain requiring continued Medication and, even though on light duty, he has missed over 130 days of work as a result of this incident compared to only 14 days missed due to injury in the 19 years prior thereto.

Published on: January 16, 2013

On June 8, 2010, the doctor performed an independent orthopedic evaluation of plaintiff.

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident on June 24, 2006 at approximately 8:45 a.m. The accident occurred at Hill Avenue at its intersection with Hempstead Turnpike, Hempstead, New York. Plaintiff alleges that he was stopped at a red light when the vehicle owned and operated by defendant rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle. The police accident report states that “motor vehicle #1 in collision with motor vehicle #2.”

In his bill of particulars, a source said that plaintiff alleges that he sustained the following injuries: subligamentous central posterior disc herniation at C4-5, subligamentous central posterior disc hernation at C5-6, impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal posterior lumbar herniation at L4-5, and straightening of the lumbar curvature.

A Lawyer said that, defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102(d). In support thereof, defendant relies uponplaintiff’s deposition testimony and an affirmed medical report of the doctor. At his examination-before-trial, plaintiff testified to his inability to perform activities due to his injuries sustained in the accident. Specifically, The Bronx plaintiff was physically restricted and not able to swim, mountain bike and exercise.