Articles Posted in Distracted Driving

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On 21 September 2003, a motor vehicle accident occurred at approximately 10:00 p.m. The victim was reportedly hit by a car while in front of 7420 13th Avenue in Brooklyn. According to the police accident report, the accident was witnessed by the husband, both of whom are listed as residing at the same address. The witness told the police officer that the driver of the vehicle and the victim were having a verbal dispute; that when the victim approached the vehicle, the driver sped away, apparently striking the victim, who fell onto the pavement and struck her head. The driver of the vehicle left the scene, but the witness reported the license plate number, V272LZ, to the police officer. The police accident report does not set forth any insurance information for the victim. Thereafter, the license plate was traced to an individual residing in Staten Island and that the vehicle is insured by an insurance company.

Beginning on or about 26 September 2003, the victim underwent medical treatment for her injuries from respondent. Respondent submitted claims to the insurance company which issued a denial on 1 December 2003, based on its investigation that the alleged driver was not involved in the loss. It is unclear whether petitioner was aware of the denial at that time. On 10 December 2003, the victim completed a “Notice of Intention to Make Claim” to the petitioner, in which she avers that her injury is not covered by insurance. She also completed an “Affidavit of No Insurance”, in which she states that she was a passenger in a vehicle insured by an insurance company; the victim swore under penalty of perjury that: on the date of the accident, she maintained no insurance which would provide coverage to her for the accident, and no person residing in her household owned an automobile or maintained such insurance.

Respondent submitted bills to petitioner totaling $4,302.79 for services. Petitioner denied the claim, since the vehicle that was reported was insured.

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A father died as a result of a vehicular accident. His surviving spouse and their two children filed a case for wrongful death against the owners of the vehicle that collided with the father’s car. After the litigation, the owners of the vehicle paid a sum of $182, 717.00 in damages.

By the time that the wrongful death suit was terminated, the surviving spouse had also died. The owners of the vehicles then filed this action to ask the court to determine who should receive the judgment award, and what the sharing should be among those who should receive the judgment award. The Long Island owners of the car that collided with the deceased’s car came to court to ask for a final determination as to the sharing of the heirs and surviving relative of the deceased in the proceeds of the wrongful death action.

The estate of the surviving spouse claims that it should receive half of the proceeds from the wrongful death suit as she is entitled to share in her deceased husband’s estate. The two surviving children of the deceased father asked for the disqualification of the surviving spouse’s estate and that the proceeds should instead be shared by them, the two children of the deceased.

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This case is about a defendant-corporation seeking the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) by reason of the Graves Amendment; and the plaintiff seeking leave of court to amend the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) in order to avoid dismissal on that ground.

Plaintiff alleged that on April 29, 2006, she sustained serious personal injuries as a result of a collision between her vehicle and a vehicle owned by defendant-corporation and operated by defendant-driver. She further alleged that defendant-driver was an employee of defendant-corporation, and was operating the vehicle “under the course of his employment,” and “with the express knowledge, consent and/or on the business” of defendant-corporation. The collision was allegedly caused by “the defendants’ negligence, carelessness and recklessness”.

A Federal statue, known as the Graves Amendment “bars vicarious liability actions against professional lessors and renters of vehicles,” as would otherwise be permitted by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. “Vicarious liability laws caused lessors to either cease leasing cars in states having them, opting for more expensive balloon note structures, or spread the cost of higher insurance premiums to lease customers nationwide.”

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This case is about a car accident which occurred in a slippery road due to the presence of snow and ice. Plaintiff wanted to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained due to the negligence of the defendants when the vehicle of the latter struck her. The County Of Suffolk, Suffolk County Department of Public Works, and the Suffolk County Police Department, were also included as defendants because they failed, inter alia, to keep and maintain Vanderbilt Parkway clear and free of accumulating ice, failed to spread salt, sand or other substances; failed to inspect the roadway where water and ice would remain, and failed to warn of the condition. In addition, plaintiff alleged that defendant County of Suffolk had actual notice of the subject icy, hazardous condition and failed to timely and properly act thus breaching its duty to maintain the roadway in a reasonably safe condition.

The County of Suffolk sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it on the basis that the County was afforded no prior written notice of the alleged defective or dangerous roadway so as to comply with the mandates of Suffolk County Charter C8-2A as a condition precedent to this action; and that the Suffolk County Police Department owed no special duty to the plaintiffs.

The evidence indicates that at the time of the car accident there was a slippery, snowy, icy area in the vicinity of Commack Middle School on Vanderbilt Parkway. The Police Officer responding to the scene testified that prior to the accidents on Vanderbilt Parkway he called in by radio to the police department to have the County send out a truck to sand the area where the accident occurred due to the snow and ice on the roadway. A Brooklyn employee of the Suffolk County Department of Public Works Highway Engineering Division testified that she did not receive any calls concerning snow or ice conditions on Vanderbilt Parkway, and yet she said that the County trucks either plowed, sanded or salted the subject roadway on January 27, 2003 without specifying the specific time it was done, the location of the work, or how the County determined that such work was indicated.

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This case is about a car accident involving three vehicles that happened at the intersection of Hempstead Turnpike and Silver Lane in Levittown. The defendants were indicted and charged with manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide on alternative theories of individual and accomplice liability.

The accident happened on January 31, 1983, around 11:00 P.M. wherein the Chevrolet Nova of the victim, which was turning left from the westbound turning lane of Hempstead Turnpike across the eastbound lanes thereof into Silver Lane, was struck by two cars rapidly approaching in the eastbound lanes of the Hempstead Turnpike. The Staten island car in the eastbound center lane, a blue Pontiac Trans Am, separated from the collision, skidded to the south curb and flipped over. The car in the eastbound left lane, a red Camaro, dragged the Nova further east down Hempstead Turnpike until they both came to a stop near the south curb. The Queens driver of the Chevrolet Nova died instantly from skull fractures and intracranial hemorrhage. The defendant-driver of the blue Trans Am was removed unconscious from his car with trauma injuries. The defendant-driver of the Camaro and his passenger sustained only minor cuts.

The prosecution introduced at trial the defendant-driver of the Camaro and moved that the case be tried before two juries, one for each defendant. The trial court granted the said motion and impaneled two juries. The members of each jury were given labels to wear designating which defendant’s fate they were considering. They were instructed by the trial court not to communicate with the members of the other defendant’s jury, and not to speculate about the reason for the presence in the courtroom at times of only one of the two juries. Opening statements were made to each jury separately and then both juries were brought into the courtroom to hear the testimony. During the introduction of the inculpatory statements of the defendant-diver Camaro, only his jury remained in the courtroom while the other defendant’s jury was excluded. Separate summations were delivered to each jury and, without objection, the court gave one charge to both juries, omitting any mention of the inculpatory statements.

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A doctor and his wife from Manhattan, riding in their Jeep were stopped at an intersection where they were in line to turn left. As they were waiting for the light, a police car came from the opposite direction. It was travelling at a high speed and when it reached the intersection, the police car skidded and started spinning.

It was the doctor’s wife who first saw the spinning police car. By the time they saw the spinning police car, it was too late to get out of its way. The police car hit the doctor’s Jeep on its left front side. The police car hit the Jeep with such force and momentum that the Jeep started spinning.

The doctor and his wife sustained injuries for which they were hospitalized and rendered unable to work. The police officer who was driving the police car was also injured. He did not have any memory of the car accident because of the head trauma which he suffered.

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A man drove to the house of a friend whom he was supposed to pick up. When he got to his friend’s house, he left the car engine running with the key in the ignition to ring the doorbell and alert his friend that he had already arrived to pick him up. While he was in the house, a man stole the car that was parked in the driveway. The thief took the car and drove off at such a high speed.

In the meantime another man was stopped at an intersection. He was waiting for the light to turn green so that he can make a left turn. As he was waiting for the traffic signal, the thief was driving from the same direction at such a high speed. The thief lost control of the He car and hit the car that was stopped at the intersection.

The impact of the stolen car hitting the stopped car was so great that the driver of the parked car lost consciousness while still inside his car. When the parked car was struck from behind by the stolen car, the parked car also careened off and hit another car.

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The action for damages stems from personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff as a result of an automobile accidentoccurred at westbound Jericho Turnpike approximately fifty (50) feet east of Wellington Road, in the County of Nassau, Town of North Hempstead, New York. The accident involved two vehicles, a 2004 Honda operated by plaintiff and a 2004 Jeep owned and operated by defendant.

A Lawyer said that, at the time of the accident, plaintiff’s vehicle was traveling westbound on Jericho Turnpike. Defendant’s vehicle was also traveling westbound on Jericho Turnpike. Plaintiff contends that her vehicle was stopped in traffic in the left lane on Jericho Turnpike when the defendant’s vehicle struck her from behind, pushing her car forward approximately one car length. Plaintiff further contends that, as a result of the heavy impact, her body was caused to move forward and backward in her vehicle and said impact caused her neck and back to strike the headrest and seat. As a result of the collision, plaintiff claims that she sustained the following injuries:

Posterior disc bulges at C3-C4, C-4-C-5 and C6-C7 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal; Small joint effusion of the left knee; Menisci and ligament/ right knee; Posterior disc herniations at the L5-S1 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal and abutting the nerve roots bilaterally; Decreased range of motion of the cervical and lumbar spine; Decreased range of motion of the left knee; Left knee pain/sprain; Cervicalgia; Lumbar disc herniation at L5-S1; Pain in the limbs; Neuropathy; Cervical sprain and strain; Lumbar sprain and strain; Lumbargo; Weakness in muscles.

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This involves a case where the court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to prove that the latter suffered serious injury threshold requirement of Insurance Law Sec. 5102 (d).

Plaintiff alleged that a car accident occurred on September 15, 2002 at approximately 5:15 p.m. at the intersection of Carman Avenue and Choir Lane in the Town of Hempstead, Long Island. Plaintiff claimed that as a result thereof, she suffered serious injuries. At her oral examination before trial, the Plaintiff testified that she had a preexisting spinal injury to her lower back from another car accident in 1988. After being treated for the injuries from that accident, the Plaintiff continued treating with a chiropractor for occasional discomfort to her back, “as needed,” rather than having a set schedule of appointments. Following the subject accident, it was suggested by multiple doctors that the Plaintiff undergo surgery and/or physical therapy, but she declined and chose to continue seeing the chiropractor instead. The Plaintiff also declined pain medication immediately following the accident, preferring over the counter medication. But plaintiff admitted she had her first doctor visit for medical expert opinion after 18 months from the accident. Following the accident, Plaintiff testified to having trouble bending over, walking long distances, participating in her children’s activities, dancing, hiking and brushing her teeth. Plaintiff claimed that she had some occasional discomfort in her back prior to the subject accident, and that the accident exacerbated that pain into a chronic condition.

The Court held that Plaintiff’s claims that her injuries satisfy the 90/180 category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) are unsupported and contradicted by her own testimony wherein she states that she only missed a week and a half of work and was confined to her home or bed for one week. Additionally, the Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that she was “medically” impaired from doing any daily activities as a result of this accident for 90 days within the first 180 days following the subject accident.

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This involves a case wherein the Court ruled that plaintiff’s injuries did not suffer a “serious injury” in the accident as defined by New York State Insurance Law which led for an order granting defendant summary judgment.

Plaintiff commenced the action against defendant allegedly for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of a car accident with defendant which occurred on November 20, 2009, at approximately 7:51 p.m., at or near the intersection of Guinea Woods Road and Jericho Turnpike, Old Westbury, County of Nassau, State of New York. The accident involved a 2008 Chrysler owned and operated by plaintiff and a 2003 Volkswagen owned and operated by defendant. It is plaintiff’s contention that the car accident occurred when defendant’s vehicle struck plaintiff’s vehicle in the aforementioned intersection when, defendant’s vehicle, while speeding, made a left turn in the intersection and failed to yield the right of way.

Defendant argued that plaintiff’s medical records establish that plaintiff had a preexisting medical history of lower back pain that pre-dates and is unrelated to the subject accident. Defendant submits that, on January 22, 2004, almost six years prior to the subject accident, plaintiff went to a physician with complaints of back pain from the proceeding year and admitted that the condition originated five to six years earlier. Defendant added that the medical records of plaintiff’s treating physician, further showed that plaintiff had pre-existing spinal injury, lumbar stenosis and pain of his lumbar spine for which he was treating from 2004 through 2006 and again in 2009 prior to the subject car accident.

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