New York Car Accident Lawyer Blog

Published on: December 5, 2012

NY TA bus in an accident with a car

by Stephen Bilkis

This involves a case where the court denied the motion of the defendants for summary judgment to dismiss the case against them.

Plaintiff alleged that, on June 16, 2007, he was injured when a New York City Transit Authority Bus driven by its employee made contact with a motor vehicle driven by defendant driver and owned by owner. Plaintiff was a passenger in defendant driver’s vehicle. By decision and order dated September 16, 2008, the court granted defendant owner’s motion to dismiss the complaint and any cross claims in this action as against it. (Martorella Affirm, dated 3/18/11, Ex E.)

The bill of particulars alleges that, as a result of this alleged car accident, plaintiff sustained herniated discs at C4-C7, and L5-S1, and injuries to his right hip, right arm, right shoulder, neck and back, some of which are believed or may be permanent in nature. (Martorella Affirm, dated 3/18/11, Ex C [Bill of Particulars ¶ 6].) In August 2008, plaintiff, who was represented by a law firm, apparently decided to represent himself. (Martorella Affirm, dated 3/18/11, Ex D.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition that, at the time of the accident, he was employed by Gotham Registry, a nursing agency, working per diem as a licensed nursing assistant.

Published on: December 3, 2012

Improper repair of a tire causes van accident

by Stephen Bilkis

On August 24, 2002 nonparty driver was driving a van with eight passengers, one of whom was an adult and seven of whom were children. While driving on a divided highway in Pennsylvania, the driver lost control of the van when the right rear tire blew out. During the resulting crash, the van barrel-rolled across the median and became airborne before landing in the lanes of oncoming traffic. All of the children were ejected from the van and sustained varying degrees of injury. The adult passenger, who remained in the vehicle, died. The appellant lawyer was retained to litigate an action on behalf of the estate and the husband of the deceased, and on behalf of these five infant passengers.

Appellant based her action upon conclusion that the tire at issue had been improperly repaired and was not the proper size for the van. Second, she concluded that the van had a faulty liftgate latch, which allowed the liftgate to open during the car accident. Consequently, she named the manufacturer of the van as a defendant.

Appellant lawyer requested an award of an attorney’s fee in a sum consistent with her retainer agreement, representing one third of the net settlement from the manufacturer of the van and 25% of the net settlement from the driver’s insurer. The Supreme Court approved so much of the proposed infant’s compromise order as concerned the amounts recovered by the infant plaintiffs, but awarded appellant lawyer an attorney’s fee in a sum representing approximately 25% of the aggregate net settlement. The lawyer appealed.

Published on: November 30, 2012

Suffolk Court rules on evidence in car accident

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a case where the court ruled that the motion by plaintiff for summary judgment on the issue of liability or fault but not as to serious injury is granted. However, the cross motion by defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to sustain a “serious injury” within the meaning of Ins. Law §5102 is denied.

This is an action arising out of a hit in the rear car accident that occurred on May 15, 2003, on Glen Cove Road at or near Pound Hollow Road, Nassau County. Plaintiff was struck in the rear by defendant’s vehicle while stopped for a red traffic light. There is no claim that plaintiff had made any short or sudden stop or turn. Plaintiff’s examination before trial testimony states that plaintiff’s vehicle was stopped for a red traffic light. As the light turned to green but before he began his forward motion, plaintiff’s vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle driven by the individual defendant and owned by the corporate defendants. Defendant testified that at the time of the car accident, plaintiffs vehicle was stopped, his view was unobstructed and there was nothing that prevented him from coming to stop before hitting plaintiffs vehicle. Although defendant posits that plaintiff testified that the traffic light had turned to green as the impact occurred, it is clear that his foot was still on the brake and that he had not begun to move.

According to the Suffolk court, there is no competent evidence to dispute plaintiff’s evidence that defendant’s vehicle struck the plaintiffs vehicle in the rear. The submission in support of the motion by plaintiff has established entitlement to judgement thus shifting the burden to defendant to rebut the motion by submitting proof in evidentiary form showing the existence of triable issues of fact. Here the defendant has failed to establish the existence of triable issues of fact on the issue of liability or fault and the Court finds no material fact issues requiring a trial with respect to the issue of fault.

Published on: November 25, 2012

Summary Judgment is moved for by defendant

by Stephen Bilkis

This involves a motion where the court denied defendant’s prayer for summary judgment to dismiss the claim of plaintiff.

Plaintiff Bianca Watler and her mother commenced an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in a car accidentthat occurred on Prospect Street in Kings County on October 25, 1996. The accident allegedly happened when a vehicle driven by defendant struck the rear of a vehicle operated by plaintiff, which was stopped due to traffic conditions on Prospect Street. The bill of particulars alleges that plaintiff sustained various injuries as a result of the collision, including a bulging disc at level L5-S1 of the lumbosacral spine; lumbar radiculopathy; right knee sprain/strain; cervical and lumbosacral sprains/strains; and “cervical paraspinal myofascitis with discogenic radiculopathy.” It further alleges that plaintiff, who sought treatment at the emergency department of Brooklyn Hospital Center immediately after the accident, was confined to home for approximately six months due to her injuries.

Defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing the claim of plaintiff on the ground that she is precluded by Insurance Law §5104 from recovering for non-economic loss, as she did not sustained a “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law §5102 (d).

Published on: November 22, 2012

Attorney has to defend himself in Traffic Court

by Stephen Bilkis

Sometimes, people assume that attorneys do not need to hire attorneys. However, the truth is that attorneys in Manhattan understand that only a fool will defend themselves. Hiring an attorney to represent a person who has incurred a personal injury is the smart thing to do. Lawyers are people, too. That means that there are times when a lawyer will hire a lawyer to help them defend themselves from a situation. These situations can come in the form of automobile accidents, estate matters, real estate matters, or personal injury. There are even times when an attorney is required to hire another attorney to defend them against a criminal matter.

Recently, in 2012, a prominent attorney was called upon to defend himself from charges of DUI that stemmed from his driving in the city of Atlanta. He slid through a traffic light at three in the morning when he thought that no one was around on his way home from a meeting with state legislatures where he had consumed two glasses of wine with dinner. Although, his driving had not endangered anyone, and he had not demonstrated any level of impairment by failing to maintain his lane of traffic, the officer who stopped him asked that he perform field sobriety tests. Field sobriety tests are voluntary. However, if you choose to perform them, your demeanor and the results of the tests can be used against you in a court of law. The attorney decided that he would not participate. He refused to participate and he was arrested by the officer for DUI and taken for a mandatory test under the laws of the state. The charges were eventually dropped with the help of a DUI attorney that was hired by the arrested attorney to defend him. Even attorneys need one every now and then.

Another case in Staten Island that involved an attorney who required legal assistance from a specialist in the field, involved a case of defamation and breach of contract that was filed by an attorney in the State of New York in 2006. The complainant attorney was not getting along with the other attorneys in her firm and decided to resign. When she left the firm, several of the clients that she had been serving chose to leave that firm and maintain her as their lawyer. The controlling partner of the law firm wrote several letters to these clients encouraging them to leave her and return to his firm. The complaining lawyer, filed a lawsuit alleging that the managing partner of her previous firm had defamed her character and breached the hiring contract that she had with him. The managing partner filed a motion with the New York State Court System to grant him a motion of summary judgment dismissing her case against him for lack of evidence.

Published on: November 20, 2012

Witnesses are called in Staten Island car accident

by Stephen Bilkis

On 21 September 2003, a motor vehicle accident occurred at approximately 10:00 p.m. The victim was reportedly hit by a car while in front of 7420 13th Avenue in Brooklyn. According to the police accident report, the accident was witnessed by the husband, both of whom are listed as residing at the same address. The witness told the police officer that the driver of the vehicle and the victim were having a verbal dispute; that when the victim approached the vehicle, the driver sped away, apparently striking the victim, who fell onto the pavement and struck her head. The driver of the vehicle left the scene, but the witness reported the license plate number, V272LZ, to the police officer. The police accident report does not set forth any insurance information for the victim. Thereafter, the license plate was traced to an individual residing in Staten Island and that the vehicle is insured by an insurance company.

Beginning on or about 26 September 2003, the victim underwent medical treatment for her injuries from respondent. Respondent submitted claims to the insurance company which issued a denial on 1 December 2003, based on its investigation that the alleged driver was not involved in the loss. It is unclear whether petitioner was aware of the denial at that time. On 10 December 2003, the victim completed a “Notice of Intention to Make Claim” to the petitioner, in which she avers that her injury is not covered by insurance. She also completed an “Affidavit of No Insurance”, in which she states that she was a passenger in a vehicle insured by an insurance company; the victim swore under penalty of perjury that: on the date of the accident, she maintained no insurance which would provide coverage to her for the accident, and no person residing in her household owned an automobile or maintained such insurance.

Respondent submitted bills to petitioner totaling $4,302.79 for services. Petitioner denied the claim, since the vehicle that was reported was insured.

Published on: November 18, 2012

Court rules on DWI

by Stephen Bilkis

A personal injury action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred at the intersection of Oceanside Road and Erwin Place in Oceanside, New York. Among other injuries, the woman suffered a traumatic brain injury.

On June 30, 2010, the Court denied the opponents’ motions for summary judgment to dismiss the woman’s complaint. The Court determined that, as the woman had yet to testify at her sworn examination before trial, the accused men’s motion for summary judgment must be denied as premature. The Court also determined that because both accused men have failed to demonstrate that the Town of Hempstead Building Zone Ordinances do not apply to them, the motion and cross motion must be denied. Finally, the Court also held that, because the driver’s operation of his motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol arguably may be deemed by the trier of fact to be a superseding cause of the woman’s injuries, the accused men’s motions for summary judgment to dismiss the woman’s action based in negligence must be denied.

The core of the Queens woman’s allegations against the accused men relates to certain bushes located between the residences, which bushes are alleged to block the view of traffic. The woman alleges that the overgrown nature of the bushes, which she claim are in contravention of height requirements provided in local ordinances, contributed in some measure to the occurrence of the serious traffic accident.

Published on: November 15, 2012

During the trial, the contractor adduced proof regarding the extent

by Stephen Bilkis

A contractor who owned a home improvement company obtained a contract to renovate a couple’s home. The man worked on the couple’s home: he was up on the roof supervising the repair of the roof when he slipped and fell. He hit his head and sustained a brain injury.

He filed a personal injury complaint against Workmen’s Compensation, against his own company and against the couple who owned the house he was renovating. In that personal injury case, trial was held to determine if the brain injury sustained by the contractor qualifies as a grave injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

During the trial, the contractor adduced proof regarding the extent and nature of his brain injury. His medical experts testified that the contractor had cognitive dysfunction which permanently disabled him from doing any work. The insurance company provided its own expert who conducted a neuropsychological evaluation of the contractor. The expert of the insurance company found that the contractor’s brain injury was severe and traumatic such that he has lost the ability to make decisions required in daily life.

Published on: November 12, 2012

The children of the also assert l if the estate of their mother

by Stephen Bilkis

A father died as a result of a vehicular accident. His surviving spouse and their two children filed a case for wrongful death against the owners of the vehicle that collided with the father’s car. After the litigation, the owners of the vehicle paid a sum of $182, 717.00 in damages.

By the time that the wrongful death suit was terminated, the surviving spouse had also died. The owners of the vehicles then filed this action to ask the court to determine who should receive the judgment award, and what the sharing should be among those who should receive the judgment award. The Long Island owners of the car that collided with the deceased’s car came to court to ask for a final determination as to the sharing of the heirs and surviving relative of the deceased in the proceeds of the wrongful death action.

The estate of the surviving spouse claims that it should receive half of the proceeds from the wrongful death suit as she is entitled to share in her deceased husband’s estate. The two surviving children of the deceased father asked for the disqualification of the surviving spouse’s estate and that the proceeds should instead be shared by them, the two children of the deceased.

Published on: November 10, 2012

The plaintiffs agreed that there is a necessity for regulation of the tow car industry

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case, the Court ruled that Section 12.0 of Ordinance No. 40 of the Town of Hempstead entitled “Operation of Tow Cars” is valid and constitutional.

The plaintiffs are in the tow car business and are licensed tow car operators in the Town of Hempstead in Nassau. The Plaintiff is seeking to declare certain sections of Ordinance No. 40 of the Town of Hempstead entitled ‘Operation of Tow Cars’ unconstitutional and void and to enjoin any action and enforcement thereunder.

The plaintiffs agreed that there is a necessity for regulation of the tow car industry. They contend, however, that section 12.0 is prohibitory, not regulatory, and therefore unconstitutional.